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The study
The study investigated the compliance of timber 
firms, chainsaw operators (illegal operators) and 
farmers to rules pertaining to on-farm timber ex-
traction in Ghana. Three rules were investigated: 
(1) the rule that requires timber firms to obtain 
informed consent from the farmer prior to tree 
felling; (2) the rule that requires timber firms to 
pay appropriate and timely compensation to the 
farmer for crop damage caused by the extraction; 
and (3) the ban on the use of chainsaws to con-
vert timber trees to lumber for domestic or com-
mercial purposes. Data were collected through 
semi-structured interviews with 337 farmers who 
had timber felled on their farms by either timber 
firms or chainsaw operators over the past five 
years, 20 timber firms and 24 chainsaw opera-
tors. 
Context/background
Ghana relies on its natural timber resources to 
meet domestic and export demands for wood 
products. Plantation forestry in the country is 
still in its infancy. The timber resources are lo-
cated in the High Forest Zone, which constitutes 
the southernmost third of Ghana with an extent 
of approximately 85 000 km2.  Around 16 000 
km2 are gazetted as forest reserves, i.e. perma-
nent forest estate. The area outside the reserves 
is denoted as “off-reserves”, and has been con-
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The study documents a low level of forest law compliance.  
The low compliance level may be attributed to a legislation, and enforcement, that is  
con sidered unfair and which, perversely, generates huge financial incentives for non- 
compliance. 
Additional law enforcement efforts are unlikely to result in sustained higher compliance. 
Rather, deeper forest policy reforms that reconsider the rights of trees (tree tenure) are  
required.
Policy Conclusions
verted to farmland dominated by perennial crops like cocoa 
and oil palm. Timber trees scattered across this agricultural 
landscape are either remnants of the tropical high forest that 
used to cover the zone, or trees that have been nurtured and 
integrated into the farming systems.
 
Timber trees are vested in the President in trust of the Stools, 
i.e. the traditional and officially recognized land-owning 
communities. In practise, the Minister of Forestry and the 
Forestry Commission have the authority to grant felling rights 
to timber companies and define management rules, and are 
responsible for rule enforcement. A share of the fees that the 
timber companies pay to the Forestry Commission goes to 
the Stools. Since 1998, legislation has banned operators who 
produce lumber with the use of chainsaws directly at the fell-
ing site (chainsaw operators) from obtaining timber rights. 
All trees for felling must exceed species-specific minimum fell-
ing diameters. The timber firm and the Forestry Commission 
undertakes a pre-felling inspection of trees identified by the 
timber firm for felling, and felling can only commence once 
the firm has received a felling permit from the Forestry Com-
mission. The regulation stipulates that the person who holds 
the farming right on the land where the tree(s) are located 
must be consulted and must give prior and informed consent 
to the felling. Further, the farmer is entitled to appropriate 
and timely compensation for any damage to crops caused by 
the felling and hauling. 
Results
Compliance with farmers’ prior and informed consent
The study included 335 farmer narratives on interactions 
with timber firms gained from 291 individual farmers (Fig 1). 
In 23% of the farmer/operator interactions (76 incidences), 
the timber firm informed the farmer of the intention to log 
in accordance with the regulation. In 66 cases, this contact 
resulted in the farmer giving consent. Yet, in 17 of these the 
farmer indicated that it was much more a matter of being 
Figure 1. Overview of interactions between timber firms and farmers.
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informed than of giving consent. In 10 narratives, the farmer 
vetoed felling. The veto was accepted in only two cases. In 
259 cases (77%) the timber firm went ahead with the felling 
without prior interaction with the farmer. Add in the 8 narra-
tives where a veto was ignored, there were 267 cases (80%) 
of timber trees felled without prior consent of farmers. In 
46 of these cases (17%), there was no further action by the 
farmer because the farmer for various reasons considered it 
useless, while in 221 cases (83%), the farmer subsequently 
approached the timber firm to obtain compensation, c.f. 
below. 
Investigated from the timber firm side, 13 timber firms (65%) 
reported that they always consult the farmer prior to the log-
ging operation, while five operators (25%) admitted that this 
practice is not always followed, because considered too time 
consuming and costly.
Compliance with compensation payment
The study also illustrated that various compensation/payment 
arrangements are applied beyond the per damaged crop rate 
compensation stipulated in the legislation. These arrange-
ments include lump-sum payments, payments for the trees 
(not compensation per se), and non binding, verbal types of 
agreements such as “will come and settle issue later”. Impor-
tantly, the study illustrates that the fulfilment of agreements 
is much higher when negotiated prior to the felling. Of the 
221 cases where the farmer approached the timber firm after 
felling, 136 cases (62%) ended without compensation/pay-
ment received by the farmer. The amount of compensation/
other payments was also higher when negotiated prior to 
felling. The interviews with timber firms confirmed the vari-
able compensation/payment arrangements although, unsur-
prisingly, the timber firms denied not fulfilling agreements.
Compliance with ban on chainsaw lumbering
Finally, the study documented a high level of on-farm chain-
saw lumbering. The study includes 179 cases of on-farm tree 
Figure 2. Overview of interactions between chainsaw operators and farmers.
felling by chainsaw operators (Fig. 2). The study shows that 
in 37 cases (21%), the farmer actively invited the chainsaw 
operator onto the farm. In 58 cases (32%), the chainsaw 
operator approached the farmer and negotiated the felling, 
while in the remaining 84 cases (47%) the trees were felled 
by the chainsaw operators without prior agreement. Here the 
farmer was able to reach an agreement with the chainsaw 
operator in 37 cases. Again, while cash payment is the typi-
cal agreement, there are also other arrangements especially 
when felling is negotiated prior to felling. As was the case for 
timber firms, fulfilment of agreements by chainsaw operators 
was higher when negotiated prior to felling. Moreover, the 
payments from chainsaw operators were significantly higher 
than those from timber firms; the level of damage was also 
lower. 
Chainsaw operators asserted that they negotiate with farm-
ers prior to felling. The results on agreement types and pay-
ments largely confirm the assertions made by the farmers.
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In relation to law enforcement, only one of the interviewed 
farmers reported being sanctioned for his engagement with 
chainsaw operators; the punishment was the relatively mild 
confiscation of produced lumber (as opposed to fines or a 
prison sentence). Yet, the interviewed chainsaw operators all 
report that they are frequently caught by the Forestry Com-
mission staff or other law enforcing agents and coerced into 
paying substantial informal fees for the release of their equip-
ment.  
Discussion and conclusions
In sum, the study documents a low compliance level for 
the three studied rules and a low level of rule enforcement. 
When rules are enforced, it is typically through informal sanc-
tions towards chainsaw operators. 
The study illustrates that farmers have a large financial incen-
tive to engage with chainsaw operators, and that the risk of 
and from sanctions is minimal. Further, farmers are likely to 
perceive current tree tenure, and the way it is implemented, 
as unjust. Farmers’ engagement with chainsaw operators 
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may thus be interpreted to involve resistance or protest. Fam-
ers may thus have both instrumental and normative reasons 
for non-compliance. 
The non-compliance of chainsaw operators can be under-
stood from a material perspective. Yet, while chainsaw opera-
tors acknowledge that their trade is illegal, they consistently 
argue that the ban is unfair, and that they should be allowed 
to operate on terms similar to the timber firms. Also the tim-
ber firms have huge financial incentives for non-compliance, 
and may further consider the current legislation and its 
implementation as unfair, since it does not effectively stop 
chainsaw lumbering.           
In conclusion, the study suggests that isolated efforts to 
strengthen enforcement of the contemporary on-farm timber 
extraction regulation are unlikely to be successful, as non-
compliance is widespread and is rooted in both material and 
normative perspectives. Eliciting compliance requires funda-
mental changes to the current incentive structures and tree 
tenure rights, i.e. giving farmers further rights to the trees on 
their farms, and an arrangement that legalizes chainsaw op-
erators and allows them to compete for trees/timber rights. 
Unfortunately, the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) 
between Ghana and the EU under the Forest Law Enforce-
ment, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) programme does not 
show promise of bringing about such changes, at least not 
in the short term, since most contemporary efforts appear 
to be focused on strengthening the enforcement of current 
legislation. 
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